The force that left Japan was small enough to name: Yamato, the cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers—Fuyutsuki, Suzutsuki, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Yukikaze, Asashimo, Hatsushimo and Kasumi. The departure roster describes the ships committed to the operation. It does not mean that every vessel could remain with the formation throughout its passage. YT-Y05
Their destination lay to the south. The written order called for entry into waters west of Okinawa at dawn on 8 April, cooperation with Japanese air and local forces, and attacks on enemy warships and transports. Reaching those waters was the first requirement. The ships would have to pass through an area in which American carrier aircraft could search for and attack them. YT-Y05
A mission measured against its means
Yamato carried the power of a battleship, but that power could not be applied at any distance she chose. Her guns needed targets within reach. Aircraft could find and strike a formation long before a surface engagement began.
Commander T. Miyamoto, a gunnery staff officer who survived, later described both the mission and the air attacks. His account makes the imbalance clear: the Japanese ships had to defend themselves while successive groups of aircraft approached. His recollection also distinguishes limited early fighter cover from the absence of effective cover during the decisive attacks. Saying that no Japanese fighter was ever present would erase that distinction. YT-Y01
Contact in the darkness
That evening, USS Threadfin encountered the outward-bound force. Her patrol report records two large ships and a screen of smaller vessels, but admits uncertainty about their identities. One large ship was initially thought possibly to be a carrier; a later note identifies it as Yamato. Threadfin sent contact reports and tried to reach a torpedo position, but speed and course changes carried the opportunity away. YT-Y24
Her orders gave the initial report priority over attacking. The submarine’s account describes that requirement being lifted later in the evening. It supplies a close view of detection and pursuit, without proving that a torpedo attack would have succeeded or tracing every subsequent command decision.
Hackleback also tracked the force. Her report describes a nearby destroyer repeatedly closing towards her, forcing turns away from the main formation. A transmitter failure complicated reporting, although the crew heard their messages repeated on the fleet broadcast. The two submarine accounts show separate positions and difficulties in following the same movement. YT-Y25
Before the familiar ending
Yamato never reached the intended battle area off Okinawa. Her own surviving report places her loss on the afternoon of 7 April. But the ending should not replace the questions that came before it. Who ordered the sortie? What were the ships expected to accomplish? What fuel was authorised, what was supplied, and what would have been required to return?
Those questions produce a more demanding story than a battleship sent out with “only enough fuel for one way.” The surviving evidence includes contemporary instructions, a shortened battle report and postwar testimony. They describe different things, and they do not yield one certified departure inventory.
The chapters that follow separate the mission from its execution, and the operation’s intended sacrifice from its practical fuel arrangements. They also keep the men within the story. A report written after the sinking can describe the loss of a ship; it cannot recover every experience aboard her. YT-Y04