Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero

Later museum summary · indexed text

Passage: Museum A6M2 description and specifications: crew, guns and protection; indexed text

Single pilot, two 20 mm cannon and two 7.7 mm machine guns; absence of armour and self-sealing tanks.

Checked: Selected indexed museum text read. Direct page retrieval failed; no aircraft image or original manual inspected.

Limits: Later institutional summary, not a dated aircraft return. Engine, speed and weight figures are not adopted; surviving display components do not establish Midway participation.

Retrospective official history · indexed text

Passage: Opening 4 June passage identifies A6M2 fighters in the Midway strike; indexed text

A6M2, D3A1 and B5N2 identification at Midway; Catalina torpedo hit on Akebono Maru.

Checked: Selected indexed passages read. Direct page retrieval failed; underlying war diaries and photographs not inspected for these claims.

Limits: Later synthesis, distinct from contemporary reports. Used for limited aircraft identification and the named oiler hit, not as independent confirmation of every reported time, loss or tactical interpretation.

Contemporary Japanese command report · archival scan

Passage: PDF p.18 / stamped 0020: Hiryū counterattack organisation and fighter diversion

The carrier command’s reported assumptions, force organisation and the division of air attack, reconnaissance, support and supply tasks. The opening island strike, request for another attack and changing armament preparations. Hiryū’s counterattack aircraft, remaining strength and later fire emergency. Akagi, Kaga and Sōryū damage and evacuation; opening island-strike allocations.

Checked: Selected Japanese passages on PDF pp.10–11 and 14–15 visually checked for chapter 1. For chapter 4, pp.16–20 visually inspected and compared with M06’s English organisation tables; pp.21–22 inspected for context on 18 October 2026. For Midway Under Attack, PDF pp.29–33 / stamped 0031–0035 visually inspected and selected passages compared with M06; pp.23–26 sampled for context. For Search and Decision, PDF pp.32–33 / stamped 0034–0035 rechecked against M39’s chronological table. PDF pp.34–35 / stamped 0036–0037 visually inspected for The Morning Strikes; p.34 supports command transfer and Hiryū’s continued ability to attack. PDF pp.35–43 rendered and visually inspected for Hiryū Fights Back: pp.35–38 cover counterattack strength, claims and Hiryū’s bombing; pp.42–43 cover fire, propulsion failure and abandonment preparations. Intervening Akagi/Kaga passages inspected for context. PDF p.44 / stamped 0046 visually inspected for the continuation of Hiryū’s evacuation to destroyers. PDF p.18 / stamped 0020 re-rendered and visually inspected for Hiryū counterattack organisation. Ship-profile expansion: PDF pp.17, 39–42 and 44–46 rendered and visually inspected; selected damage passages compared with M06. Cruiser-profile review, 18–19 October 2026: PDF pp.32–33 / stamped 0034–0035 visually rechecked for the successive Tone No.4 reports and decisions. PDF p.45 / stamped 0047 visually rechecked on 21 October 2026 for the Isokaze profile: rescue, treatment and transfer to Hamakaze and Isokaze. The already retained scan was used; a fresh JACAR viewer request returned HTTP 403.

Limits: Working readings, not a certified full translation. The report was compiled after the battle and some tables include actual results, not just pre-battle plans. The English table’s Haruna aircraft type differs from the Japanese image; no type is assigned here. M06 transmits the same report family. Opening narrative compresses later attacks into the same paragraph. Its dates and times are not silently merged with the American chronology; message timing and flight-deck readiness require further records. Initial-contact timing differs between the narrative and M39’s chronological table; no fixed message delay is inferred. Predicted aircraft readiness is not a completed launch. Japanese counterattack target identities and claimed damage on these pages are not confirmed outcomes. Evacuation entries are not a complete personnel roll; scuttling orders and final sinking times remain distinct. Exact bomb-hit counts and the compressed Kaga/Sōryū terminal sinking passages do not settle scuttling contributions. Akagi command-transfer times differ within the report; no single minute is adopted. Sōryū evacuation: M14 PDF p.45 / stamped 0047 names Hamakaze and Isokaze (磯風); M06 renders the second as Isonami. The profile follows the original Japanese name.

Contemporary command report · selected scan pages checked; earlier passages read in transcription

Passage: PDF / printed p.25, paragraphs 73–75: fighter assessment and patrol recommendations

The broad course of the battle and the report’s explicit clock convention. Later pursuit, cruiser attacks and rescue from Yorktown.

Checked: Earlier preparation, timing and attack passages read in modern transcriptions; paragraphs 13–18, 19–25 and 27–36 rechecked on 18 October 2026. For the aftermath chapters, a 28-page scan of serial 01849 was retained and PDF / printed pp.1 and 17–21 rendered and visually inspected. Earlier chapter passages have not all been compared with these images. The report date is taken from the transcription; it is not legible on the inspected first-page image. PDF / printed p.25 visually inspected for fighter assessment, replacement groups and training. Aircraft expansion: PDF / printed pp.6–12, 23 and 25 visually inspected on 18 October 2026; night attack, scout reports, TBF/TBD operations, fighter allocations and equipment assessments. Supporting-ship update: PDF/printed pp.21–22 visually inspected for paragraphs 62–65, including the continuation of paragraph 63. Cruiser-profile review, 18–19 October 2026: PDF / printed pp.20–21 visually rechecked for 6 June attacks and the erroneous two-cruiser sinking claim.

Limits: Preliminary enemy identifications and loss estimates are not final accounting. The report uses Zone plus 12; task-force reports can use a different clock. Both web copies transmit the same report. The apparent 126 B-17 transcription error is not adopted. Early hit claims and a possible fifth carrier are not accepted as established facts. Early warning times differ from M31. The statement implying deliberately spared runways is not adopted; M32 records actual runway damage and repairs. Torpedo hits, early Sōryū damage, additional ships claimed hit and precise deck conditions are not adopted as confirmed facts. Aircraft losses are distinct from personnel losses. Its retrospective sacrifice explanation is not treated as a deliberate attack plan. Its claim that both Mogami and Mikuma sank is rejected; its preliminary personnel total is not a final casualty roll. The scan does not include the separately listed enclosures. Paragraph 74’s claimed fighter exchange ratio is not treated as a verified loss total or controlled performance comparison. Early damage and hit claims on these pages are not adopted as confirmed results. The retrospective sacrifice explanation is not an order for a planned diversion. The reported two hits on Hammann differ from the captain’s account; post-sinking explosion explanations remain tentative. Ships dispatched to assist are not all treated as having arrived.