Launching the American strike did not ensure that its parts would reach the enemy together. Search decisions separated aircraft that were meant to support one another. Hornet’s dive bombers failed to find the Japanese carriers that morning. Her torpedo squadron did find them, and went in without the coordinated protection of the larger striking force. M01
The Japanese carriers were still manoeuvring, defending themselves and working their aircraft. Finding them meant entering a battle already in progress.
The torpedo crews go in
Hornet’s torpedo squadron, led by Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, suffered the loss of all fifteen aircraft. Nimitz’s report records ten of fourteen lost from Enterprise’s torpedo squadron and ten of twelve from Yorktown’s. These are aircraft losses, not a count of everyone killed. Claims in the same report that torpedoes hit Japanese carriers are not accepted here as confirmed results. M01
The attacks required crews to approach a moving ship while exposed to fighters and gunfire. The lack of effective fighter protection was central to Nimitz’s explanation of the losses. Their courage did not remove the need for coordination, or make aircraft sent against a defended fleet expendable. M01
Above the carriers
Enterprise’s dive bombers had their own difficulties. Bombing Squadron Six’s report describes oxygen problems on the outward flight. Its commander, Lieutenant Richard Best, brought his formation down below the rest of the group after noticing difficulties among his wingmen. Fuel was also a concern: carrying a heavy bomb through a prolonged flight reduced the margin for getting home. M17
The squadron report lists different weapons within the same attack group. Its fifteen VB-6 SBDs each carried a 1,000-pound bomb. The sixteen VS-6 aircraft listed alongside them carried a 500-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs apiece. A shared aircraft designation did not mean a uniform load. These are the squadron’s reported assignments for this mission, not a general specification for every SBD at Midway. M17
Once the carriers were sighted, assigning targets was another problem. Best’s report says that he understood his target to be the carrier on the left, then saw VS-6 diving on it. He redirected his own attack towards the other carrier. The immediate account conveys the confusion clearly, even though its carrier-type identification cannot safely be treated as a confirmed ship name. M17
Dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown set Akagi, Kaga and Sōryū ablaze. They were disabled in a short period, but they did not all sink at the moment the bombs struck. M01 M39
An opening in the defence
VB-6 reported no fighter opposition before its aircraft pulled out of their dives, followed by fighter attacks during withdrawal. Its commander believed much of the antiaircraft fire had been directed at torpedo aircraft attacking nearby. That is evidence of the opening experienced by this squadron, not a complete picture of every Japanese fighter’s position. M17
The Japanese chronological table records Akagi manoeuvring against torpedo aircraft, then responding to dive bombers. It also records fighters beginning to take off before the hits on Akagi. The defence was occupied and disrupted, but had not simply disappeared. The torpedo attacks and dive bombing should not be turned into a prearranged sacrifice in which one group knowingly died to clear the way for another. M39
Fire below the flight deck
The Japanese record follows the bombing into a rapidly worsening emergency. It notes fires aboard Kaga, hits on Akagi and damage to Sōryū. A subsequent entry records torpedoes exploding in Akagi’s hangar and orders to flood ammunition and bomb spaces. Damage to valves prevented some of that flooding from being carried out promptly. M39
The English rendering of the narrative describes fire spreading through Akagi’s hangar while preparations for another attack were under way. It should be read alongside the chronological entries, which give a more detailed sequence of damage-control attempts. Neither justifies a precise claim that a complete strike was standing on the flight deck only moments from launch. M06 M39
The bombs had struck ships containing aircraft, fuel and weapons. The ability to contain the resulting fires mattered as much as the visible holes in the flight deck.
Getting home—and fighting on
Success over the target did not guarantee survival on the return flight. VB-6’s report records five of its fifteen aircraft returning, crews from four others rescued, and six crews still unaccounted for at the time of reporting. Those categories must remain separate. M17
One returning aircraft carried the wounded rear gunner Stuart Mason. The report credits him with continuing to defend the aircraft and repairing its damaged radio, helping it locate its carrier. The morning’s result depended on people enduring the journey back as well as delivering their bombs. M17
Three Japanese carriers had been crippled, but Hiryū remained able to attack. The Japanese command transferred away from the damaged flagship, and Hiryū sent aircraft against the American carriers. The next chapter follows that counterstroke—and why the Americans’ extraordinary success had not yet made their own ships safe. M14