A connected ship profile

HMS Anson

Anson brought a battleship’s guns to the operation, but her central role was as a flagship. From her, Vice-Admiral Moore directed a carrier force and weighed whether to send its aircrews into action again.

Profile · Evidence and limits

About 1942 · catalogue attribution

HMS Anson fires her guns during passing-out trials in the North Sea, in an official photograph catalogued as about 1942.

Lt C. J. Ware, Royal Navy official photographer / Imperial War Museums, A 10150 · Source · Public domain (source statement)

Identification, date and credit checked against the Commons reproduction of IWM A 10150. The direct IWM catalogue request was inaccessible in this pass. This shows trials, not the April 1944 attack on Tirpitz. Commons marks the official photograph public domain under PD-UKGov.

A battleship carrying the commander

The Admiralty’s Tungsten ship list identifies Anson as Vice-Admiral Sir Henry R. Moore’s flagship. It names Captain E. D. B. McCarthy as her commanding officer and records ten 14-inch guns and sixteen 5.25-inch high-angle/low-angle guns. Those particulars belong to the operation’s own list. YT-T22

Moore was second-in-command of the Home Fleet. His responsibilities extended beyond the ship beneath his flag: he had to bring the attacking forces together, get the carriers to their launching position and decide what to do once their aircraft returned.

The distinction explains Anson’s place in this story. The weapons that struck Tirpitz were carried by aircraft. Anson provided the flagship from which the operation was conducted; the inspected account does not describe her firing her main battery at the German battleship.

Convoy cover and a rendezvous

Tungsten was coordinated with the passage of the Arctic convoy JW 58. In the original passage organisation, Anson belonged to Force 1 with Duke of York, Victorious, Belfast and six destroyers, covering the convoy. Duke of York carried the Commander-in-Chief; Anson carried Moore. A second force under Rear-Admiral Bisset was to join them before the attack. YT-T22

The forces met on 2 April. At 1620, the Commander-in-Chief in Duke of York parted company with two destroyers. Moore continued towards the flying-off position with the Tungsten forces. The Admiralty summary records Anson at the head of Force 7 with Victorious, Furious, Jamaica, Belfast and six destroyers. Royalist, Bisset’s flagship, headed Force 8 with the escort carriers. YT-T22

The two flagships therefore served different levels of command within the same operation. Anson’s connection with Royalist helps make sense of a fleet whose organisation changed between the passage north and the air attack itself.

Whether to strike again

After the attacks on 3 April, Moore initially intended to repeat the operation the following morning. Destroyer refuelling began urgently, even though it temporarily reduced the force’s protection against submarines. Keeping the option of another strike open had a cost for the ships supporting the carriers. YT-T22

The decision then changed. The Admiralty account says Moore received reports of serious damage to Tirpitz and of the aircrews’ fatigue. He cancelled further operations and ordered the forces, including the fleet oilers, back to base.

This was a decision made from the reports available at sea. The damage assessment helps explain why Moore withdrew; it is not itself a final survey of Tirpitz’s condition. The Tungsten chapter follows the separate question of what the attack actually did to her readiness.

Bringing the force home

Forces 7 and 8 turned for home on the evening of 3 April and entered Scapa Flow on 6 April. Searcher, slowed by a defect, followed with an escort; the oilers also returned separately. The operation’s end still required managing ships with different speeds and needs. YT-T22

Anson’s contribution is easiest to understand through those decisions. Her flagship role connected the convoy cover, the carrier attack, destroyer fuel, aircrew endurance and the return passage. The battleship’s large guns were only one part of what she brought to the operation.

Evidence within reach

Sources for this page

Open a note for the passage, inspection status and limits. Source records link to the available documents.

YT-T22Admiralty Battle Summary No. 27: Operation Tungsten

Official wartime operational synthesis · scan of printed edition

Passage: Printed pp.2, 5, 9 and 12 / PDF pp.8, 11, 15 and 18: convoy cover, command, return decision and ship list

Shared Victorious/Furious strike organisation; squadron exchange; aircraft preparation and fleet protection; planned flying programme; Barracuda II and selected bomb loads; conditional expectations for bomb effects. Reported release heights and the two-aircraft reduction in the second strike.

Checked: Title and source-list pages and the cited printed pages visually inspected on 20 October 2026. Full 40-page scan retained with SHA-256; selected page renders retained. Source list identifies Home Fleet report M.056731/44 and carrier reports dated 5 April 1944. Appendix E read as a programme, not an execution log. Printed p.1 and strike observations on pp.6–7 also visually checked for the gun profiles. Printed pp.2, 7 and 14 / PDF pp.8, 13 and 20 rechecked for Hellcat roles, aircraft particulars and the damaged-hook loss. Printed pp.2, 12, 15, 22 and 24 / PDF pp.8, 18, 21, 28 and 30 visually checked on 20 October 2026 for Emperor’s roster, two fighter groups, Hoare’s loss and the flying programme. Printed pp.7, 12, 14–15 and 24 / PDF pp.13, 18, 20–21 and 30 visually checked on 21 October 2026 for Searcher, Fell’s escort role and the Wildcat variants. Printed pp.4, 6, 12, 15 and 24 / PDF pp.10, 12, 18, 21 and 30 visually checked on 21 October 2026 for Pursuer, Graham, Sleigh, the steering incident and Wilkinson’s return footnote. Printed pp.3, 6, 8, 12 and 24 / PDF pp.9, 12, 14, 18 and 30 visually rechecked on 21 October 2026 for Fencer’s fleet protection, aircraft and flying programme. Printed pp.2–5, 9 and 12 / PDF pp.8–11, 15 and 18 visually rechecked on 21 October 2026 for Royalist, Bisset, Eveleigh, force reorganisation and Sheffield. Printed pp.2, 5, 9 and 12 / PDF pp.8, 11, 15 and 18 visually rechecked on 21 October 2026 for Anson, Moore, McCarthy, guns, Force 7 and the decision to cancel the repeat attack.

Limits: An official synthesis compiled from reports, not the signed original reports of Victorious and Furious. Its source list is evidence of the compiler’s sources, not proof we inspected those manuscripts. Aircraft allocation, actual departures, aircraft attacking and fleet-defence aircraft are distinct counts. The bomb-penetration heights are planning expectations, not confirmed damage results. No exact bomb mark, explosive fill or reconstructed complete flight log is assigned. Its armament footnote is a British assessment, not a dated German final-fit return. Its HA/LA label for the 5.9-inch battery is not adopted; the new profiles do not classify those guns as dual-purpose. Strike descriptions preserve the attackers’ viewpoint. The flying programme is a planned schedule; Emperor’s complete log and squadron records have not been independently compared. The aircraft table lists Wildcat V and VI but does not map them to individual carriers; no mark is assigned to every Searcher aircraft from that table. Pursuer’s steering failure is recorded without a precise mechanical diagnosis; the account describes a narrowly avoided incident, not a collision. The aircrew roster is not a complete flying log. The planned four airborne and four standby Wildcats are not a complete execution log. Twenty-five fleet-defence fighters combine Seafires and Wildcats; nine retained Swordfish do not mean nine continuously airborne. Force 2 and Force 8 are successive operational groupings, not interchangeable labels. Seventeen knots is the mixed force’s stated maximum, not Royalist’s individual maximum. Royalist’s eight 5.25-inch guns are operation-list particulars; no bombardment of Tirpitz or complete fighter-control log is established.

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