During the early hours of 25 May, Suffolk was following Bismarck near the limit of her radar’s reach. The British ships were also zigzagging against the danger of submarine attack. On the legs that took Suffolk away from the enemy, contact was temporarily lost. That had happened before. This time, the expected return did not come. B11
Tovey’s despatch describes Bismarck turning sharply to starboard while Suffolk was moving to port. By the time the cruiser came back, the German battleship had gone. Suffolk searched towards the last bearing, then reported the loss of contact at 0401, using the despatch’s zone-minus-two clock, two hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time. B11
When a working system failed
Tovey’s retrospective judgement was severe: successful radar shadowing had encouraged overconfidence. But the circumstances he records also show the competing demands on the cruisers. They had to stay close enough to follow a dangerous opponent while taking precautions against another threat below the surface. B11
The other British ships could not simply replace Suffolk’s radar coverage. Prince of Wales’s equipment had proved unreliable, and Norfolk’s worked only over limited bearings ahead. The force had been organised around Suffolk maintaining contact. Once she lost it, the whole pursuit lost its immediate guide. B11
Even the apparent number of German ships was uncertain. Tovey reported that Suffolk’s last contacts suggested Prinz Eugen remained with Bismarck. The printed edition’s Admiralty footnote corrects this: the cruiser had separated the previous evening. The British were searching with an incomplete picture of the enemy’s movements. B11
Which way had she gone?
Suffolk’s captain initially allowed for Bismarck increasing speed and turning a little farther to starboard. Wake-Walker considered a larger turn west or an escape eastwards behind the shadowing ships. These were alternatives to be investigated, not observed tracks. B11
For Tovey, the question was also what Bismarck intended to do next. A damaged ship might seek a dockyard. A ship that could reach a tanker might refuel and continue operating in the Atlantic. His available aircraft and surface ships could not cover every possibility. He initially gave priority to the tanker routes because a refuelled German force at large would pose the more immediate danger to shipping. B11
That choice explains why the search did not immediately concentrate on the route Bismarck was actually taking. Tovey was weighing the consequences of missing each possibility as well as judging which destination seemed likely.
Searching with incomplete positions
King George V moved south-west to cover a possible southerly course. Tovey considered launching her Walrus aircraft to search astern, but the swell threatened the aircraft’s recovery. Stopping to pick up its crew would also expose the battleship to submarine attack. He did not launch it. His later report acknowledges that this search might have found Bismarck; it does not say success was certain. B11
Victorious and her accompanying cruisers were ordered to search north-west of the last known enemy position. Here another uncertainty intervened: Tovey thought the carrier force was farther north than it really was. His despatch concludes that the resulting air search probably did not reach far enough. The problem was not only locating the Germans; it was directing scattered British forces from imperfect knowledge of their positions. B11
Other ships covered possible escape routes, including Rodney towards the Bay of Biscay and Edinburgh nearer the route to Gibraltar. This was a wide search, but it was not a continuous barrier across the ocean. B11
A misleading bearing plot
Later that morning, the Admiralty supplied radio direction-finding bearings believed to come from Bismarck. Radio bearings could help locate a ship beyond visual or radar range. Their value depended on how they were interpreted and plotted.
As plotted aboard King George V, the bearings placed the enemy too far north. Tovey consequently believed Bismarck was heading back towards the North Sea. He circulated that position and turned towards the Iceland–Faroes passage. The despatch identifies the misleading plot aboard his flagship; it does not support treating the Admiralty’s bearings themselves as a confirmed position. B11
A subsequent position from the Admiralty redirected the chase towards a French port. King George V, Rodney, Norfolk, Edinburgh and Force H made for the Bay of Biscay. An evening search by Coastal Command flying boats still failed to locate Bismarck. Fresh patrols were arranged across her probable route for the following morning. B11
The British now had a stronger idea of where to look, but still no ship or aircraft maintaining contact. The next chapter follows the search that finally found her again.