On the morning of 26 May, a Coastal Command Catalina found Bismarck again. The long search now had a position to work from. It did not yet have an interception. Tovey’s account placed the German battleship about 130 miles south of King George V when the first report arrived, making towards France with a lead his battleships could not readily overcome. B11
The immediate opportunity lay with Force H: Renown, Ark Royal and Sheffield. Its aircraft could reach Bismarck before the pursuing battleships could. First they had to find her themselves and keep her under observation.
Searching from a moving deck
Somerville had been directed to work on the assumption that Bismarck was heading for Brest. His search had to allow for uncertainty over her speed and for the movement of his own ships. Heavy seas had slowed Force H overnight, forcing another adjustment to the area its aircraft would cover. B11 B04
Ark Royal launched ten Swordfish at 0835, in the time used by Somerville’s despatch. The carrier was working in a rough sea and a force-seven wind. Spray wetted the flight deck; aircraft slid as the ship rolled. Fulmar fighters that might have enlarged the search were not added because of the conditions. The weather constrained how much of the ocean could be examined, even before the aircraft began looking. B04
Coastal Command’s flying boats were also searching. Somerville records that the Catalina’s report, timed 1030, reached him at 1050. That distinction matters: a sighting at sea and usable information aboard a distant ship were not the same event. He ordered aircraft with long-range fuel tanks to prepare to take over the shadowing. B04
Finding was only the beginning
The Catalina could not guarantee continuous contact. A subsequent message reported its hull holed by shell splinters; another said that it had lost touch. Ark Royal therefore needed its own aircraft over the target before the renewed search dissolved into another uncertain position. B04
Two aircraft already out searching helped close that gap. Somerville records one contact message initially identifying a cruiser, followed by another reporting a battleship. Identification sharpened as reports accumulated. Aircraft specifically equipped for longer shadowing flights left Ark Royal at noon and relieved the search aircraft. B04
The positions also needed correction. Tovey’s later account judged the first Catalina position about 35 miles in error. An early Ark Royal aircraft position was displaced because the carrier’s own assumed position was wrong. These reports were useful without being exact. A commander could know that the enemy had been found and still be uncertain where to send the next aircraft. B11
Reliefs then sustained air shadowing through the day. This was an ongoing operation: aircraft had to reach the battleship, report her movements and hand over before returning. Ark Royal, meanwhile, had to manoeuvre for flying operations while keeping within useful striking distance. B04 B11
A target beyond the battleships’ reach
Force H’s presence did not mean Somerville could simply send Renown into a gun battle. The Admiralty’s instructions restricted her from engaging Bismarck unless the German ship was already heavily engaged by King George V or Rodney. Finding an enemy battleship did not remove the danger she posed to the force maintaining contact. B04
Nor could the ships farther astern pursue indefinitely. Fuel shortages had already limited the available escorts and ruled out some combinations of ships and aircraft. Tovey’s assessment was that Bismarck had to be slowed or diverted if his battleships were to catch her. Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft offered the immediate means of doing that. B11
The regained contact had transformed an open-ocean search into a target that could be attacked. It had not made Bismarck’s destruction inevitable. The next task was to turn observation into a damaging strike—and to make certain the aircraft attacked the right ship.
Continue with The carrier attacks.