The steering damage inflicted by Ark Royal’s aircraft changed the pursuit. Bismarck could no longer maintain the course she needed towards France. Tovey initially tried to close that evening, but rain squalls, failing light and uncertain positions made an immediate engagement too hazardous. He worked round to approach from the west the following morning. B11
Between the carrier attack and the battleships’ arrival lay a night in which contact still had to be maintained. The damaged ship remained dangerous to anyone who approached her.
Holding contact through the night
Captain Philip Vian’s force included Cossack, Maori, Zulu, Sikh and the Polish destroyer Piorun. After Bismarck’s gunfire forced Sheffield away, these smaller ships took over the close pursuit. Piorun sighted the battleship and exchanged fire before withdrawing under smoke. B11
Vian’s priority was to keep contact; torpedo attacks were secondary and were to be made when opportunities justified the risk. In heavy seas and poor visibility, the destroyers had to follow a ship whose main and secondary guns could still engage them. Tovey credited their persistence with keeping Bismarck available for the morning battle. His claims of destroyer torpedo hits are not treated here as independently confirmed damage. B11
Even then, the British picture was imperfect. Reported courses varied, and ships that had spent days operating separately disagreed about their relative positions. Starshells intended to show Tovey where Bismarck lay were obscured by squalls. Damaged aerials complicated the alternative of taking radio bearings. He waited for full light. B11
Choosing the approach
Tovey judged that Bismarck’s guns and their control arrangements were still effective, but that her inability to steer gave him the choice of approach. He intended to use the wind, sea and light to his advantage, present a difficult target and close until repeated hits became likely. This was a tactical advantage created by the previous evening’s damage, rather than evidence that Bismarck had ceased to be a fighting ship. B11
Reports from Maori helped establish the relative position. Norfolk then provided a visual link as King George V and Rodney came in. At 0843, in Tovey’s zone-minus-two clock (two hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time), Bismarck appeared at about 25,000 yards. Rodney opened fire at 0847; King George V followed a minute later. Bismarck replied, initially concentrating on Rodney. B11
The guns close the distance
The British ships did not remain in a neat line firing identical salvos. Turns to open the guns’ arcs and avoid interference separated the two battleships. Tovey welcomed that separation. Later their lines of fire lay roughly at right angles, allowing each to observe its shell splashes with less interference from the other. Norfolk and Dorsetshire also fired. B11
Rodney carried nine 16-inch guns in three triple turrets, all forward. Their arrangement did not mean every gun could bear at every moment. Her preliminary gunnery report records that the rearmost main turret could engage on only six of the first twenty-five salvos. It also lists loading failures during the action. A ship’s nominal armament and the fire it could actually deliver were different things. B09
Tovey describes Bismarck’s opening fire as accurate, then increasingly ineffective. After about half an hour, he reported fires in several places and only one turret still firing, erratically. This is his view from outside the ship; it is not a complete account of when each German gun or control position failed. B11
The battleships continued to close, eventually reaching about 3,300 yards. By 1015, Tovey described Bismarck as burning from end to end, with no gun firing and men going over the side. The battle had destroyed her ability to resist before it had sent her beneath the surface. B11
A wreck still afloat
Fuel was again decisive for the British. Tovey needed enough to return at a useful speed and to survive possible further damage from aircraft or submarines. Judging that more gunfire would do little to hasten the end, he broke off with the battleships and ordered ships with torpedoes remaining to use them. Dorsetshire torpedoed Bismarck at close range. Tovey records the sinking at 1037. B11
That account does not settle every question about the final flooding. The British interrogation report records survivors describing orders to abandon and scuttle the ship, and evidence that explosive charges were fired. It also acknowledges disagreement among survivors about the cause of sinking. The account survives here as a modern transcription, not an inspected original page. B24
Gunfire, torpedoes and reported scuttling measures belong in the explanation together. These sources do not justify assigning an exact share of the flooding to each, or using the scuttling evidence to suggest that Bismarck could still escape. Her destruction as a fighting ship was already apparent. B11 B24
For the men in the water, the end of the action began another struggle. Dorsetshire and Maori started taking survivors aboard. The rescue, its interruption and the lives remembered afterwards belong to the next chapter. B11