When Prince of Wales turned away under smoke, the battle did not leave the British with a simple choice between courage and retreat. Hood was gone. The surviving battleship had suffered damage, and her guns had been giving trouble. The cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk could help keep track of the Germans, but risking them in another gun action might also cost the fleet its means of finding Bismarck. B11
Rear-Admiral Frederic Wake-Walker, in Norfolk, had to decide what his remaining force could usefully do. The answer would shape the hours after Hood’s destruction.
Keep her in sight
Tovey’s despatch preserves Wake-Walker’s explanation. He considered attacking with the whole force, but Prince of Wales was still working up, her fighting condition was uncertain, and the British had no assured speed advantage. Closing the cruisers to effective gun range exposed them to damage that could prevent further shadowing. He chose to concentrate on bringing Tovey’s heavier force into the battle. B11
That was a judgement made with imperfect information. Wake-Walker expected Tovey sooner than he could realistically arrive; an Admiralty footnote in the printed despatch corrects his calculation. Tovey later endorsed the decision to maintain contact. His endorsement is evidence of the commander’s assessment, rather than proof that every alternative would have failed. B11
Suffolk shadowed from the German force’s starboard quarter, while Norfolk and Prince of Wales followed on the port side. Weather and changes of course complicated the task. A later exchange of gunfire again brought trouble with Prince of Wales’s main armament. Keeping contact was an active operation, with the possibility of another fight always present. B11
A damaged ship could still escape
British observers could not immediately establish how badly Bismarck had been hit. A reproduced German signal supplies a different view: Lütjens reported restricted cruising speed and deeper immersion at the bow following a hit forward. The sheet’s archival chain remains unconfirmed, but its damage statement is visible in the reproduced German text. B18
Damage did not mean that Bismarck was stopped. Tovey still needed to close the distance. His despatch describes concern that she might turn west towards an oiler, as well as the difficulty of bringing ships approaching from different directions into action together. A predicted interception was only a forecast: it depended on the enemy’s course and speed continuing to favour it. B11
Fuel narrowed the margin. Repulse could remain only for a short action before needing to make for Newfoundland. Destroyers also had to leave to refuel. The strength available on a chart was not necessarily the strength that could stay beside the flagship when battle came. B11
Victorious reaches out
On the afternoon of 24 May, Tovey detached Victorious with a cruiser escort to launch a torpedo attack. The immediate purpose was to reduce Bismarck’s speed. This also committed the carrier and her aircraft to a demanding sortie when they might otherwise be needed for searching the next morning. B11
Victorious was newly commissioned. Her nine Swordfish took off that evening; eight eventually attacked. Airborne radar helped the aircraft find their way towards the target, but cloud interrupted contact, and directions from Norfolk helped them find Bismarck again. The report records at least one torpedo hit. B11
The return was another test. Victorious’s homing beacon was out of action. In darkness and rain, with endurance running short, the Swordfish crews needed radio direction-finding assistance and a signal projector to reach the carrier. The aircraft’s contribution depended on navigation, communications and recovery as well as carrying a torpedo. B11
The chase was still open
Victorious’s attack must be kept separate from Ark Royal’s later strike on 26 May. Tovey’s original wording gave the earlier hit great weight in the eventual sinking; an Admiralty footnote qualifies that assessment and identifies the later rudder damage as the immediate, principal reason the British could intercept. The first attack had not delivered that result. B11
By the early hours of 25 May, the British still depended on shadowing Bismarck. Suffolk’s radar was particularly important: the other ships’ equipment did not provide an interchangeable substitute. The next chapter follows what happened when that contact failed—and a pursuit became a search. B11