An attack on Midway would require several operations to succeed together. Aircraft had to suppress the island’s air power. Landing troops had to reach the beaches and overcome the defences. At sea, the Japanese needed to protect that effort and deal with an American fleet response. The First Air Fleet’s organisation table assigned its air attack force both the destruction of enemy naval forces and support of the occupation force. M14
The American plan sought to hold Midway and inflict maximum damage on the enemy. It directed the carriers to exploit an opportunity created by the island attack, while avoiding action likely to cause heavy losses among their own carriers and cruisers. The battle was therefore being approached as both a chance and a danger. M26
The Japanese tasks
Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū appear in the First Air Fleet report’s aircraft organisation. The Midway attack table combines attack aircraft, bombers and fighters from the four carriers. The separate reconnaissance table assigns searching aircraft to Akagi and Kaga and to the supporting ships Tone, Chikuma and Haruna. The ships around the carriers supplied part of the force’s ability to find an enemy, as well as protection. M14 M06
The report also separates supporting warships, a destroyer screen and supply vessels. A carrier force could strike far beyond gun range, but it still depended on ships carrying fuel, watching the approaches and helping it survive an attack. M14
These tables come from a report compiled after the battle. Some rows include actual attack results and disruptions. They must not all be read as instructions issued before departure. Here they establish the organisation and division of work; the sequence of attacks belongs in the later chapters.
The landing behind the air attack
A Japanese Army operational outline dated 5 May gives the intended landing a more concrete shape. The Ichiki Detachment was to attack Eastern Island, while naval landing troops were to take Sand Island. Naval air attacks were to destroy the defending air strength and damage the defences before the landing. The outline envisaged air operations beginning roughly two days before the assault. M36
This was an early plan, not a record of troops reaching the beaches. Its importance is the dependency it reveals: the landing force expected the air battle to prepare the way. An island still able to launch attacks would threaten the ships and boats bringing troops ashore.
The carrier command also expected to retain the ability to defeat an American naval counterattack after striking Midway. Its later report records the pre-battle belief that no powerful American carrier force was nearby and that the Japanese operation remained undiscovered. Those assumptions help explain the plan; they do not describe the Americans’ actual knowledge or position. M14 M06
The American opportunity
Nimitz’s Operation Plan 29-42 listed Enterprise and Hornet in Task Force 16 under Spruance, and Yorktown in Task Force 17 under Fletcher. It also listed Saratoga in Task Force 11—but the same document expected that force to depart the American west coast on 5 June. A name in the organisation table did not make a fourth carrier available for the opening battle. Yorktown’s availability was itself still conditional on her condition when the plan was written. M26
The striking forces were to operate initially north-east of Midway. From there, they were to seek an initial advantage against Japanese carriers whose air groups were attacking the island. The plan also required air searches and gave submarines their own patrol and attack tasks. Knowing the likely objective did not provide a live position for every enemy ship. M26
Midway’s defence was therefore part of a wider effort to damage the approaching force. But preserving the American carriers remained an explicit constraint. Nimitz needed ships that could fight after this battle as well as during it. M26
Where the plans met
The central tension is visible before the first attack. The Japanese carrier force intended to support the capture of Midway while remaining ready for an enemy fleet. The American carriers were being positioned to take advantage of the demands that the island attack would place on that force.
Neither plan could make its opportunities happen automatically. Search crews had to locate ships, reports had to reach commanders, and aircraft had to be launched with useful targets in view. The next chapter follows the first contacts, when the fleets began to learn how far events matched their expectations.