On the night after the carrier attacks, Rear-Admiral Raymond Spruance still had decisions to make with incomplete information. Japanese surface ships remained a threat, and reports had not settled whether another carrier was nearby. He could not plan as though he already possessed the later historian’s inventory of the enemy fleet. M43
His force moved east before turning west again. The intention was to avoid a night encounter with potentially superior surface forces while remaining able to defend Midway or pursue a withdrawal. The American carriers had won a great advantage. Keeping them intact was part of exploiting it. M43
Finding the retreating ships
The following day brought a pursuit through uncertain reports. Nimitz’s account records a submarine sighting that initially raised concern about an approach to Midway, followed by information suggesting retirement. Search aircraft were sent far out, but a reported carrier force was not found. M01
Enterprise’s squadron reports describe a late strike on 5 June expecting a much more valuable target than the vessel it eventually attacked. The aircraft found no carrier; their report recorded near misses against a ship identified as a light cruiser. Some pilots then had to land on a carrier at night for the first time. A fruitless search could still demand considerable flying skill and expose crews to danger. M17
For some Japanese ships, the withdrawal had already become a struggle. In postwar interrogation, officers from the cruiser force described an emergency turn after a submarine sighting. Mogami collided with Mikuma, badly damaging Mogami’s bow. Their account places the collision before the air attacks on the retreating cruisers. It is later testimony, rather than a surviving contemporary damage log inspected for this chapter. M46
The attacks on the cruisers
American aircraft from Midway attacked on 5 June. Their reports included hit claims that cannot simply be carried into a final account of Japanese damage. Carrier aircraft attacked again on 6 June, in a sequence Nimitz’s report records as strikes from Hornet, Enterprise and Hornet. M01
The Enterprise squadron record shows how uncertainty persisted even during the attack. Aircraft searched beyond the cruisers for a reported battleship before turning back to attack the ships actually found. A report of a battleship was not proof that one was there. The search, the target finally attacked and the damage subsequently claimed are separate pieces of evidence. M17
Mikuma was lost. Mogami, although damaged, survived to reach a Japanese base and later return to Japan. That distinction is important because Nimitz’s June report credited the Americans with sinking both cruisers. Comparing it with the Japanese officers’ later account changes the result: the contemporary American summary overstated the ships destroyed. M01 M46
The pursuit also had practical limits. Worsening weather complicated operations, while destroyers were running short of fuel. The American force could not keep steaming west indefinitely without regard to the ships protecting its carriers. M01
A carrier still worth saving
Elsewhere, Yorktown remained afloat after the attacks of 4 June. Abandonment had been an emergency response to an increasing list and the loss of power. It did not mean that the crew had given up every possibility of recovering her.
The technical damage report records the tug Vireo taking the carrier in tow on 5 June. The tow made only about two knots. On 6 June a salvage party returned to a ship still leaning heavily to port, with material smouldering in the forward rag stowage. This was a damaged ship being worked on, not an empty wreck awaiting its inevitable end. M18
The destroyer Hammann came alongside to supply power and assistance. Men removed weight from the low side, pumped water and admitted water to selected spaces on the opposite side. That last measure, counterflooding, could reduce the lean by changing the balance of weight. It also added water to the ship, so a smaller list was not by itself proof that she was safer. M18
The second disaster
On 6 June, a Japanese submarine’s torpedoes reached the salvage operation. Hammann was hit and sank rapidly. Two torpedoes struck Yorktown’s starboard side. A heavy underwater explosion followed the destroyer’s sinking; the technical report tentatively attributed it to depth charges. M18
Yorktown did not immediately disappear. Her list actually decreased, but she settled deeper in the water. This is one of the clearest warnings against judging a damaged ship by her angle alone: flooding could make her look more upright while worsening her overall condition. M18
The salvage party left before dark, closing watertight openings as it withdrew. The carrier survived another night. On the morning of 7 June the list increased, and Yorktown capsized and sank. Her loss came after a separate submarine attack had interrupted a real attempt to save her. M18
Midway’s outcome therefore cannot be reduced to the few minutes in which three Japanese carriers were set on fire. Withdrawal, searching, further bombing and salvage continued to change the losses. For the men on damaged ships, in aircraft overdue to return, or waiting in the water, those later days were still part of the battle.